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Election years are a good time to take stock. This is all
the more true in 1994, Germany's "super election year':
the German economy is stuck in the deepest recession
since the Second World War, unemployment is rising
sharply, not only in East, but also, indeed above all, in
West Gemany, and the burden of public debt is grow-
ing rapidly. Tlais provideg ample justification to take a
closer look at the financial aspects of German Unity,
their costs and the consequences for labour market and
employment policy.
Unification indeed presents An enormolul challenge
to Germany's public finances. It has led to an immense
debtburden, onewhich, however, is spread overdiverse
budgets and special firnds (so-called "shadow budgets"),
so that its actual order of magnitude is tfficult to
determine. One thing, though, has certainly become
clear: the concept according to which Geman Unifica-
tion has been financed, based on short-term bomowing
to pumpprime the East German econgmy, has not
worked out. There is still no sign of a self-sustaining
recovery in the new federal states, and West-East
transfers ofbillions ofD-Marks 
- 
around DM 163 billion
in 1993, almost two thirds of East Gemany's GDP 
-
will continue to be necessary. Ttre failure of the financing
concept has had serious consequences, especially for labour
market policy. Despite growing need, cut-backs are being
concentrated in this area.
The last edition ofthe Employment Observatory looked,
from an empirical-statistical perspective, atthe anomaly of
slowly increasing wealth coupled with growing dissatisfac-
tion, particularly in East Germany. In this edition we take
up the theme again, this time in the form of an essay: for
even supposedly "objective" numbers sometimes call for
additional reflection.
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National accounts of the German Economic Research Institute (DIW), Octnber 1993 and January 1994 (rows l.-3.4, 5.,6.-6.7); Official
Reports and Press Releases of the Federal Employment Service (rows 7.1, 7 .2, 8.2, 10.-10.5); Institute for Employment Research (1AB),
IAB-Kurzberichte and,IAB-Werkstattberichte (rows 4.,4.1,5.2,8.1); Infratest Social Research, labour market monitor for the new Federal
states, MunichA.rTuremberg 1991-93 (rows 4.2, 5.1); Federal Ministry ofFinance,Finanznachrichtenkow 5.2); calculations by the editors.
Comments:
In general, stock data in the table correspond with frgures drawn up at the end ofthe given half-year periods (except: rowa 4.2,5.1: data
for May or November; rows 5., 6.1-6.7: averages ofthe 2nd and 4th quarters respectively; row 5.2: 1990/91 1 January and 1 July after the
end ofthe half-years; rows 7.2, 7.3: for lst half-year 1990 frgures are from mid-July).
Row5.2: figureforthe lsthalf-yearof1990 is arough estimate; row 7.1: Ilom 1993 includes"wage-cost subsidiesEast"; row 7.3: number
of short-time workers multiplied by the average amount of working time lost; row 8.1: until mid 1992 estimated; rows 9.1, 11.1: potential
Iabour force defrned as the sum of resident wage and salary eamers, self-employed, unemployed and the participants in further training
and early retirement; rows 10.3-10.5: from 1993 onwards the basis of the unemplo5rment rate has been changed (dependent civilian
working population in June 1992; earlier basis dated from the end of 1989, then from November 1990).
ECONOMIC AND LABOUR MARKET STATISTICS
Econony
1. Gross Domestic Product in 1991 prices(billions of DM)
2. Gross value added by sectorin 1991 prices
(billions of DM)
2.1 furiculture and forestry
2.2 Energy and mining
2.3 Manufacturing
2.4 Construction
2.5 Trade and transport
2.6 Services
2.7 Government
3. Expenditure on the Gross National Product
in 1991 prices (billions of DM)
3.1 Private consumption
3.2 Government consumption
3.3 Fixed capital formation
3.4 Exports minus imports
Labour market
4. Working-age population (in thousands)
4.1 Migrations to West Germany (in thousands)
4.2 Commuters to West Germany (in thougands)
5. Total employment (in thousands)
5.1 Share of female employment (7o)
5.2 Employees inTleuhand companies (in thousands)
6. Employment by sector (in thousands)
6.1 Agriculture and forestry
6.2 Energy and mining
6.3 Manufacturing
6.4 Construction
6.5 Trade and transport
6.6 Services
6.7 Government(incl.ABMs)
7. Employment in Iabour market measures (in thousands)
7.1 Employed in job creation meaaures (ABMg)
7.2 Short-time workers
7.3 Full-time equivalent of loss of working hours
in case of short-time working
8. Non-active population in labour market meaaures
(in thousends)
8.1 In full-time further training measures
8.2 ln early rebirement
9. Total persons in Iabour market measures
(7 
.L + 7.3 + 8.1 + 8.2) (in thousands)
9.7 AsVo ofpotential labourforce
10. Total unemployment (in thousands)
10.1 Unemployed women (in thousandg)
10.2 Unemployed women (7o)
10.3 Unemploym ent r atn (Vo)
10.4 Male unemployment rate (Vo)
10.5 Female unemployment rutc (Vo)
11. Shortfall of"regulaf employment (9.+10.) (in thousands)
l1-.l AsVo ofpotential labour force
Sources:
lst lst 2nd
half- half- half-year year year
1989 19fl) 1990
L49.L 150.1 t05.2
lst 2nd lst
half- half- half-year year year
1991 1991 L992
2nd 1st
half- hatf-
year yeaf, year
t9s2 1998 1998
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Financing German Unification 
- 
lmplications for
Labour Market Policy and Employment
In the frr'st few years after Unifrcation, public spending in the new
federal states was frnanced without either a realistic assessment of the
actual resources required or a long-term frnancial concept. Ihe result
has been a rising level of public debt with grave consequences for
econor"ic and emploJment policy. As far as labour market policy is
concer:ned, the decision to frnance all benefrts and policy measures out
of the tightly restricted budget of the unemplo5rment insurance fund
has had particularly negative consequences. Ihis joint frnancing is the
main reason why active labour market policies have now become a
prime target of spending cuts.
Unification presents an enorrnous
challenge to Germany's public fi-
nances. The new federal states re-
quire a large volume of public spend-
ing to extend and moderrrise infra-
structure, to promote private invest-
ment, clean up environmental dam-
age, finance labour market policy,
service outstanding debts etc. At the
same time, the weak state of the East
German economymeans that the new
kinder generate little by way of frscal
revenue. Consequently, public spend-
ing in East Germany must be prima-
rily financed by financial transfers
from West Germany. In 1992 and
1993 these financial transfers
amounted to between DM 150 and 170
billion per annum, a figure corre-
sponding to around two thirds of East
German GDP (table 1). All the avail-
able prognoses indicate thatthere will
be no decline in the level ofsupport in
the near future.
The public debt and "shadow
budgets"
The need for massive financial re-
sources in the new federal states has
largely been met by borrowing. Back
in 1990, at the start of the Unification
process, the Federal Government
based its policies on the view that the
adjustment crisis in East Germany
would be of short duration, rapidly
giving way to a broad-based, self-sus-
taining recovery. Government would
merely have to provide initial finance
- 
pump-priming 
- 
which could be cov-
eredby a temporary increase in public
borrowing. In the general election
campaign which took place at the end
of 1990 the governing parties even
claimed that no tax increases would
be required to finance the transforma-
tion process in eastern Germany. As,
in the subsequent years, the recovery
failed to get under way, the Federal
Government was forced successively
to revise its expectations and its poli-
cies, and to raise taxes. First ofall, in
mid 1991, a "solidarity supplement" of
7.5Vo on income and corporation tax
was introduced for one year; at the
beginning of 1993, and with reference
to the need to harmonise taxation
within the EC, value-added tax was
increased by one percentage point.
Petroleum taxes were raised sharply
in two stages, and, finally, the re-
introduction of the solidarity supple-
ment in 1995 was announced. Al-
though these changes in taxation law
increased fiscal revenue by DM 15
billion in 1991 and DM 28 billion in
1992, the additional revenue fell to
DM 23 billion in 1993 (due to the
expiry of the solidarity supplement),
and the additional revenue generated
was in no way sufficient to meet the
sharp rise in spending. As a result 
-
and, since 1993, also due to the reces-
sion-induced fall in fiscal revenue 
-
public spending had increasingly to be
financed by borrowing. Within the
space of three years 
- 
from 1989 to
Table 1: Public Financial Trans-
fers from West to East Germany,
1990-94
1990 DM 45 billion
1991 DM 129 billion
7992 DM 150 billion
1993 DM 163 billion
1994 DM 166 billion
Source: Deutsches Institut fur
Wirtschaltsforschung (DlW)
1992 
- 
the public debt increased by
more than half. As can be seen from
table 2, however, this rising debt did
not primarily occur in central and
state government budgets, but rather
in various "special funds", most of
which were set up in the wake of
Unification. The most important are
described be]ow.
- 
the "German Unity Fund" (Fonds
Deutsche Einheit) was set up in
1990 in orderto support, until 1994,
state and local government in East
Germany in the fulfiIment of their
tasks and to compensate them for
their lack offiscal revenue. 60Vo of
the Fund's resources-totalling DM
161 billion 
- 
are financed firectly
on the financial markets, the re-
mainder provided by central and (to
a lesser extent) state government.
From 1995 over two thirds of the
debt servicing payments will be
made by state and local govern-
ment in West Germany and just
under a third by central govern-
ment.
- 
the Treuhandanstalt. Although
this institution, the provisional
owner of the formerly state-owned
enterprises of the GDR (cf. East
Germany no. 1, p. 5), receives in-
come from the sale (privatisation)
ofits enterprises, its expenditure 
-
supporting, liquidating, restruc-
turing its firms 
- 
far exceeds its
income. The ?reuhand.anstah must
cover its deficit on the financial
markets. By the end of 1994 its
overall debt (including the out-
standing debts of its frrms) is ex-
pected to total DM 275 billion. In
1995 these debts, together with
those of the "Kreditabwicklungs-
fond,s" (see below) and some of the
debts incurred by the East German
housing sector are to be brought
together in one fund (the ?16-
lastentilgungsfonds" 
- 
roughly: in-
herited debt servicing fund). This
fund will take on a debt of at least
DM 435 billion, with the Federal
Government bearing responsibility
for interest and principal repay-
ments.
- 
the Kreditabwicklungsfonds (debt
servicing fund). This fund brings
together outstanding debts origi-
natingfrom the GDRIs government
budget and liabilities incurred by
the state when the East German
Markwas converted to the D-Mark.
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Currently, interest on this debt is
being paid jointly by the Federal
Government and the Treuhandan-
stalt. In 1995 this fund is to be
succeeded by the Erblastentil-
gungsfond,s.
- 
The "special assets" (Sonderuerm6-
gen) oftheEuropean Recovery Pro-
gtamme. These resources originate
from financial returns from the
Marshall PIan (European Recovery
Programme). Since the Second
World War they have been used to
provide loans at favourable condi-
tions to small and medium-sized
firms within the framework of re-
gional policy. Between 1989 and
1992 the debts incurred by the fund
more than trebled due to the huge
demand for such Ioans by East Ger-
man firms. Still, in absolute terms
it is less important than the other
funds.
As can be seen from table 2, past
trends are expected to continue in the
near future. According to the progno-
sis made by the German Institute for
Economic Research (DIW), the public
debt will rise rapidly until 1995, by
which time it will have reached twice
its 1989 ]evel.
Negative coruequences of the(Unifrcation boom'
The swift expansion of credit-fi-
nanced public spending in East Ger-
many was in effect a Keynesian de-
mand management programme for
the West German economy: to a con-
siderable extent the additional de-
mand so generated was met by West
German goods and services. At times
this led to a doubling of West Germa-
ny's rate of growth, and to employ-
ment expansion of 1.5 million per-
sons between 1989 and 1991. Unfor-
tunately the demand boost occurred
at a time when capacity utilisation in
German industry had just hit record
levels and overall growth was strong,
so that the West German economy
did not require a demand impulse,
certainly not one of this magnitude.
The ensuing "Unification boom" gen-
erated infl ationary expectations (and
did in fact contribute to a rise in con-
sumer price inflation from 3.5Vo in
1991 to 4.07o in 1992), forcing the
Bundesbank to adopt restrictive
monetary policies: German base
rates rose by around two percentage
points between 1990 and the start of
1992. Despite the growing signs of a
recession, rates were subsequently
reduced only hesitantly from this
level.
Clearly the underlying conception
of the financing of German Unifrca-
tion, based on short-term pump-prim-
ing covered by additional borrowing,
which seriously underestimated the
volume of resources required, has in-
duced negative economic and employ-
ment effects which have reached far
beyond East Germany itself. The high
level ofinterest rates to which it gave
rise accelerated the recession which
began in 1992 and was a prime cause
of the de facto collapse of the Euro-
pean Monetary System in the summer
of L993. Simultaneously it has tied the
hands of German government to pur-
sue anti-cyclical fiscal policies in the
face ofrecession. The rise in the level
of debt and the rate of interest to-
gether meant that interest pa5rments
increased from 97o to almost llVo of
fiscal revenue between 1989 and
1993; by 1995 this figure is expected to
rise to over l4Vo. This has dramati-
cally narrowed the scope for deficit
spending to counter the recession.
Funding labour market policy
Labour market policy has enjoyed a
special status with regard to the fi-
nancing of Uffi cation-induced public
spending in East Germany. As early
as 1990 it was apparent that the Fed-
eral Labour Office would have to bear
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the dramatic rise in the costs of labour
market policy measures in the new
federal states, while its receipts of
insurance contributions there would
be relatively small. In order to close
the inevitable "gap" resulting from
these trends two basic options were
available: the Federal Government,
with parliamentary approval, could
cover the deficit by providing funds
from the central government budget,
i.e., in the final analysis, fund it out of
tax revenue or additional borrowing,
or it could increase the contribution
paid by both employees and employ-
ers to the Federal Labour Office
("unemplo5rment insurance contribu-
tion"). It was this second option which
was frnally taken: on l April 1991the
contribution paid equally to the Fed-
eral Labour Office by employees and
employers was raised from 4.3Vo of
gross wages to 6.8Vo. This decision
meant that the labour market policy
adjustment and support measures in
East Germany 
- 
on top of those in
West Germany-were, in principle, to
be financed solely out ofsocial insur-
ance contributions (cf. East Germany
no.3/4, p. l2).
The prime motive forthe decision to
finance labour market policy in East
Germany by means of social insur-
ance contributions rather than taxes
was clearly the election promise made
in the autumn of 1990 that German
Uffication would not lead to tax in-
Table 2: Public-Sector Debtr) in Gemany (DM billions)
1989 1992 19952)
Central government
State government
West
East
Local government3)
West
East
ERP Special Assets
German Unity Fund
Kre dit ab w ic k I u ng s fo nd s
Treuhandanstalt
Rail assets6)
49L
308
308
11;
118
7
607
384
374
10
151
139
L2
24
74
92r
10? I
837
510
zto
29
95
70
Total 924 1,439 2,L86
l)The Treuhandanstalt does not belong to the public sector according to the official
flrnancial statistics. It is nevertheless included in these calculations because from
1995 its debts will become public debt (a part of the Erblastentilgungsfonds) which
must be served by central government.
2) Prognosis by the DIW.
3) Local goverrrment including special-purpose associations.
4)The Erblastentilgungsfonds including DM 31 billion ofoutstanding debt from East
German housing associations.
5) Debt incurred by the Federal Railways and assumed by central government.
Source: DIW; calculations by the author
creases. It is now all too apparent that
this decision has had negative conse-
quences for labour market policy and
employment trends. The most impor-
tant of these are as follows:
- 
raising the cost oflabour as a factor
of production: The increase in the
rate of contribution to the unem-
plo5mrent insurance fund has
meant higher indirect wage costs
for employers and thus raised the
cost oflabour 
- 
absolutely and rela-
tively 
- 
as a factor of production.
This represents a barrier to ex-
panding employment in East Ger-
many, providing a incentive for la-
bour-saving rationalisation.
- 
Vertical redistribution: On the re-
ceipt side, the increase in the rate of
contribution to the unemployment
insurance fund places a more than
proportional burden on low income
earrers. This is because contribu-
tions are only made on wage and
salary income up to a current maxi-
mum of DM 7,600 per month in
West and DM 5,900 per month in
East Germany; entrepreneurial
and property income are not af-
fected at all. On the spending side,
on the other hand, the contribu-
tions are used to finance measures
whose effects reach far beyond the
group paylng contributions and
which are ofbenefitto those on high
incomes: further training and job
creation schemes, for example, help
to overcome skill shortages, im-
prove infrastructure, render com-
mercial sites suitable for produc-
tion and rectifu environmental
damage. In doing so they help to
overcome barriers to investment,
promote new job creation and thus
benefit the economy and society as
a whole.
- 
Pro-cyclical labour market policy:
as early as the 1970s and 1980s it
became evident in the "old" Federal
Republic that fi nancing both unem-
ployment benefit and active labour
market policies out of the contribu-
tions to the unemplo5rment insur-
ance fund tended to mean that ac-
tive labour market policies followed
a pro-cyclical course: whenever un-
employment rose, so did the costs of
financing unemploSrment benefit;
simultaneously the Federal Labour
Office's receipts fell. Although the
resulting deficit in the Office's
budget was covered by central gov-
ernment funds, the Federal Gov-
ernment and Parliament often at-
tempted, when faced with this situ-
ation, to keep central government
funding to a minimum by passing
legal amendments restricting the
benefits and services provided by
the Federal Labour Office. These
cutbacks usually hit active labour
market policy measures hardest, as
they were seen as more "flexible"
than unemployment benefit. The
consequence was that spending on
active labour market policy tended
to follow a pro-cyclical course: when
unemployment rose over an ex-
tended period, or remained at a
high level, spending on active la-
bour market policy fell (as a propor-
tion of GDP); when unemployment
was falling it rose (cf. figure, espe-
cially the yearc 1976/77 and 1982-
85, 1978179 and 1986-88).
Active labour market policies 
-
a prime target for spending cuts
This pattern, characteristic of the
"old" Federal Republic, is now repeat-
ing itself in the unified Germany. Al-
though the rise in contribution rates
of April 1991 initially met the in-
creased spending requirements of the
Federal Labour Office in East Ger-
many, enabling active labour market
policies to be implemented at a level
which is almost certainly without his-
torical precedent, since 1992 contri-
butions have not been sufficient to
finance spending; ever increasing
transfers from the central govern-
ment budget have been necessary. In
line with the pattern described above,
FOCUS
these transfers have now become a
prime target for spending cuts. The
laws accompanylng the central gov-
ernment budgets of 1993 and 1994
have cut spending by the Federal La-
bour Office more than in other areas
(cf. East Germany no. 6, p. 8). Thus,
despite rising unemplo5rment, spend-
ing on active labour market policies is
now falling- pro-cyclically (cf. figure).
Once more the practice of financing
unemployment benefit and active la-
bour market policies out of the lim-
ited, and strictly contribution-fi-
nanced budget ofthe Federal Labour
Office has proved to be a mechanism
which leads, in tight budgetary situa-
tions, to competition between the two
types of spending, making active la-
bour market policy the object of re-
strictive fiscalist consideration to a
greater extent than other policy
areas.
Bernd Reisseft
The author is professor at the Fachhochschu-
Ie ftir Technik und Wirtschaft,, Berlin
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ESSAY
Mood and Situation
The Depressed Mood in East and West Germany 
- 
Based on Fact or Fiction
l\To, the mood currently prevailing in Germany, in bothI \ the old and the new kind.er can scarcely be described
as optimistic, not to mention euphoric. Indeed, if a number
of reports are to be believed, the mood appears in many
cases to be worse than the actual situation. In a nutshell,
the finding is that there is a discrepancy between "subjec-
tive" mood and the "objective" situation; seen by the light of
day, there is no material justification for many of the
complaints being raised. I would like to illustrate the
practical significance of this discrepancy by means of the
following example, taken from the 'Berliner Zeitungl,
12.11.93: Under the title nSome Easterners are better off
than they think", and the sub-title "Average income of
many East German households higher than in some dis-
tricts of West Berlin' was an article, the concluding sen-
tence of which ran as follows: "The mood is worse than the
actual situation". The article reported on a microcensus
conducted by the Statistical Office of Berlin which revealed
that average monthly net household income in the East
Berlin district ofHellersdorf is, at DM 2,650, higher than in
the West Berlin districts of Schtineberg (2,600), Neukdln
(2,550), Charlottenburg (2,500), Tiergarten (2.450), Wed-
ding (2,350) and Kreuzberg (2,150). In other words the
Easterners might moan, but they're really doing very
nicely, thank-you. The lesson drawn was that the de-
pressed mood among those living in the new federal states
must be brought back into line, i.e. revised upwards in
accordance with the facts.
7T ftt. illustration reveals a fundamental problem. The
I various social groups, small and large, in the new
Germany are, namely, all but unanimous in diagnosing and
propagating a mood-situation discrepancy and the need for
"therapy". They are bitterly divided, on the other hand,
when it comes to deciding whose mood requires adjustment
to its real situation, which group is in greatest need ofan
anti-depression therapy: East or West Germany, employ-
ers or workers, sellers or customers, those on social benefrt
or the middle classes, the unemployed or civil servants,
political parties or the electorate, the state or its citizens.
Reading the newspaper or watching television I am olten
reminded of a bon mot which did the rounds in the former
GDR: "The situation is hopeless, but not serious". Now that
the awareness is gradually growing that belts are going to
have to be tightened to a greater extent than was generally
believed four years ago, representatives ofinterest groups
are taking up position in the public arena, claiming that it
is high time that one or more of the other groups pulled in
their stomachs, let out some air and went on a crash diet.
Lean is in. The result is a double-track strategy which is
both exhausting and dangerous: first, social "diet plans" are
to be drawn up which are to be made tasty for, and, where
possible, prescribed without further ado to, other groups;
secondly, one's own clientele is to be protected against
slimming proposals from outside; aft,er all one does not
want to lose them. The consequences of this are three-fold:
firstly, the temptation grows to adopt this strategy oneself,
so as not to be pushed aside or completely go under 
- 
and
tough luck for those who are unable or unwilling to follow
suit; secondly, this "lean poker" requires ever increasing
degrees ofsubtlety from all participants, as those demand-
ing that others endure hunger pains must declare their
willingness to slim down if their credibility and public
support are not to be threatened; thirdly, finally, and most
seriously, all this leads to a further drop in the subjective
mood barometer. Disaffectiongrows. Motivation sinks. The
vicious circle is complete. Not only the legendary man (or
woman) on the street grows tired of trying to puzzle out the
pros and cons of the interminable programmatic debates
and tactical manoeuvring- not to mention getting involved
him/herself. In short, the therapy exacerbates the depres-
sion, rather than easing it. This provides food for thought.,
and raises a number ofquestions. One ofthese concerns the
accuracy of the initial diagnosis: what precisely is meant by
the discrepancy between mood and situation?
[l o start with, the way in which this discrepancy isI usually brought up and fiscussed is olten based on a
problematic assumption, namely the view that people's
mood and situation should, more orless, coincide: situation
good 
- 
mood good; situation bad 
- 
mood bad. Discrepancies
are anomalies. It seems fair to ask whether the reverse is
not true, i.e. whether such equivalences are the exception
rather than the rule. This is not as strange as it might
appear if one remembers that entire periods of recent
history 
- 
the Great Depression or the 1950s, for instance 
-
are often described or remembered in terms of such a
discrepancy between mood and situation. Has it not now
become established practice to speak of people's 6lan or
enthusiasm when the mood appears better than the situa-
tion, while attesting them neuroses or depression when
their mood falls below that supposedly justified by the
situation. And ifit is indeed the case, and this is neither new
nor exceptional, that the "zeitgeist" ofuplilting periods is
reconstructed by means of positive, and that of periods of
decline by negative mood-situation differentials, then does
this not inevitably pose the question, What do we really
mean by'normal" social developments and "usual" mood-
situation relationships?
tfl t int ing these questions through, it is but a short step
I to a further, more fundamental problem. As everyone
knows, it is standard practice to attest those complaining of
periodic faintness, nausea or headaches a perfectly good
state ofhealth for no other reason than that the test and
analysis procedures employed did not produce a positive
finding, and the patent recipes prescribed as a matter of
course did not produce the expected results. Medical diag-
noses of this type and the therapy recommended as a result
- 
"Drive the silly thoughts out ofyour head, then you'll feel
frne" 
- 
are now treated with caution and mistrust by many
doctors and patients 
- 
and with good reason. Social diag-
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noses of a similar nature, though, olten meet with far fewer
reservations. It may well be that, as with the medical
profession, appropriate diagnostic methods are simply not
available. Nevertheless, or precisely because ofthis fact,
both those examining and those being examined are well
advised not to draw the simple conclusion that: "society as
a whole OK 
- 
members of society objectively OK, but
subjectively sickly and ungrateful". Not only does this give
a further twist to the spiral of depression, we are surely not
in need offurtherproof to conclude that a social programme
of this type 
- 
whether scientific or political in nature 
- 
is
bound to fail sooner or later. Aft,er forty years of "actually
{xisting socialism", those livingin the new federal states, at
least, are all too well aware of this.
(J 
"" 
of the difficulties involved in measuring mood-
\./ situation relations with any precision is that moods
are not due solely 
- 
and in some cases not at all 
- 
to the
concrete situation to which they refer. Whether the sight of
the approaching end of a good bottle of wine induces
feelings ofsatisfaction or dissatisfaction depends on a large
number of factors; whether the bottle is seen as still halffuIl
or already half empty, for instance, how thirsty one is, what
other beverages are at hand, who else is helping themselves
to wine or whether one generally has the impression that
one is not getting one's ofair share". Different people react
differently, indeed, in ways which are diametrically op-
posed 
- 
inner peace or open panic 
- 
to one and the same fact
- 
here the open wine bottle 
- 
depending on the way in which
they feel obliged to interpret the situation. The converse
case also occurs, namely that different interpretations ofa
situation lead to one and the same mood. This can be
illustrated by means of the example referred to above. In
interpreting the income gap between the districts of East
and West Berlin, two factors were identffied as being
responsible: skill levels and double-earner households.
Leaving aside other statistical details, such as income
variations and household size, I will consider these two
factors, based on which two extreme points of view can be
constructed. These indicate the moods which can feed on
this objective differential. The extreme West Gerrnan point
of view: a blue-collar worker in the district of Wedding, in
full-time employment, but the sole bread-winner: "We're
handing over the billions, but have got less and less to
spare. The end of the story is that alter three years of
German Unification the Easterners, who never stop moan-
ing, are better off than we are. Enough is enough." The
extreme in the East: a public-sector white-collar worker
and a chemical engineer whose job-creation scheme is
coming to an end. The former: "Basically I'm glad I've got a
job that I enjoy and that is fairly secure. But when I see
what some bosses in West Germany earn, what they actu-
ally do and the privileges they have, then I don't see why we
should wait for ever and a day for our wages to be brought
in line with those in the West". The latter: "At the moment
things are OI! but in my branch the labour market is fully
blocked, my degree and occupational experience are worth
nothing, and when the job-creation scheme, which is little
more than occupational therapy, runs out, then I'll be on
the street or selling chips". Thus, while the interpretations
differ, the mood is the same.
f) Uviousty, both points of view need to be extended., and\-/ account taken of nuances of opinion. In doing so it
would seem to me to be important, not to say vital, to face
ESSAY
up from the very outset to three probable and far-reaching
conclusions which, at first sight, might appear banal.
Firstly, each ofthese perspectives is rooted in experiences
shared by millions ofpeople over years and decades. Each
is, for itself, logical and conclusive. They are not erroneous
views of life, which can be bent into shape under the force
of a few good arguments. Secondly, where these different
views come up against each other, day in day out, there
arises a sort of zero-s rm-game situation 
- 
what one side
seeks to gain or retain, the other must lose. Ttrirdly, in such
situations, participants are very clearly and substantively
aware ofwhat they are losing, but only vaguely conscious,
if at all, of what they might stand to gain. And that is a
recipe for a bad mood.
J Jnder the current circumstances, seeing things in this\-,/ way is likely to be due less to the short-sightedness,
than to the long-sightedness and perception ofthe inhabit-
ants of the new Germany. Does not their "bad mood", for
which they are so ofben criticised, reflect a seismographic
intuition that the situation in which we all find ourselves is
undergoing fundamental and irreversible transition, a
transition which will lead to major social restructuring and
place a severe strain on the fabric of the new German
society? Ifin their day-to-day life people repeatedly receive
confirmation of the view that individual life (and indeed
survival) chances are primarily (oreven exclusively) linked
to the retention and extension of acquired rights and
possessions, while at the same time they are increasingly
worried that in the course of the current distributional
conflicts they are in danger of losing all that they have
acquired (or expect to acquire), not just temporarily, but
permanently, then it is surely hardly surprising that many
people see a bleak future ahead of them, and that their
mood is more in accordance with these expectations that
their current or past situation.
erely disqualifoing such views as unjustified pessi-
mism and proposing abstract "think positive" phi-
losophies orfrery appeals formoderation maybe a approach
commonly employed; it is nevertheless inadequate to the
problem. Campaigns ofthis type 
- 
this much at least should
have become clear during the last four years 
- 
will not
overcome the depressed mood, neither in East nor in West
Germany. Itis high time that social moods, and the changes
in objective situation to which they give expression, were
taken seriously and given due consideration. Not regarding
the general direction, but certainly in terms ofthe concrete
steps 
- 
and that means those which can be experienced by
people in theireveryday lives-all those involved in politics,
the economy and academic Iife in the new Germany cer-
tainly have their work cut out.
Lutz Marz
The author is researcher att}rreWZB.
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INSTRUMENTS
Wage-cost Subsidies East under S249h of the
Labour Promotion Act 
- 
A New lnstrument on Trial
A new labour market policy instrument, the'\rage-cost subsidy East'
under S249h of the Labour Promotion Act (LPA), has been available in
the new federal states since the start of 1993. The subsidies enable
'r'emplo]rment assistance funds to be used directly for employment-
creating projects for the frrst time, providing support for work in the
frelds of environrnental renewal, social services and youth aid. Al-
though it contains some innovative ideas, the instrument, often dis-
missed as merely a form of job-creation programme, is very contro-
versial.
The programme of wage cost subsi- An innovative labour market
dies, due to run until 1997, was intro- policy approach
duced when the amended LPA came
into force at the start 
"ii6s3 r.f. E*i ., 
As far as the.approach is. concerned'
Germanyno.6,p.8;no.3/4,p. 16). In ::r""* lnstrumenr prcKs up a
view or Germany's *ra#iJ r";g"t l::Y^"j'::::jtl-"ll'::*:-'l*
deficit the aim was to o.o"r.ia" t-"t 
" 
nave Deen arouno rn tne (ierrnan .,e-
Federal Labour offi." *i"fi;; i"; bateonlabour.marketpolicyforsome
pensive form of support for those lTf]*"""af,f,nesamef,rmemarKlng
whose job-creation *n"*".-tasM) 1 :,11_*.::l:ttf'-'::::l,the waY in
had expired in the new federal states. whrch support ls proEded'
As the originally pt..";;;iti;";L; - The wage cost subsidv is based on
bourpromotionEnviroil;;;"#: the principle of financing work
indicates, speciat 
"-pdri.";;;;;"" 
rather than unemplo5rment' and of
to the rarge-scare 
";;",;;;:;;i Y:il-Tgti:11tT:11]:Iprojects-knownasmegajob-creation ment asslstance scneme to dlrect
projects 
- 
in which 
""til'";th";;;t 
emplovrnent-creating measures'
on rhe environment h"#;;;;";;; The level of support is equal to the
to a conclusion nor ,;;;ffi;; average level of unemplo5rment as-
creared for those t.k""^;;-;;;;r';;; sistance in East Germanv (includ-
scheme. As the 
".oro.ii.;;.r.r 
ing health and pension insurance
has atso led to tt 
" 
*ia".p."lu#;iil; contributions) and is granted for a
of social institutions, ;h#;;;; T"mum of three vears (older un-
GDR had been rargery';;&;; :T*:t11"11T:".1t1:::.1:Ty
enterprises, social services and youtir dlsabled are entrtled to a maxlmum
aid measures were r"."*"rJr'"i-". of four years)' In 1993 the subsidy
areas entitlea to .rppori"rtil rh;i.,"ii amounted to a flat rate of DM 1'260
instrument. per month or DM 15,120 per year
Participants in job-creation pro- p^er worker' However' in the eco-
grarnmeswhoseschem;;;;;#; Iogical field the annual personnel
expirearenottheonrvex"o,$;i;rril :1,,i#?::T|:TfiJI;',il"Iffito wage-cost subsidies under the pro- ndyouthg,u--". otherbenen.rll::,i:-11- :il"j1;ffi:?ffi:fi'::?rewase_
employed persons and those short-
time workers for *hom";;;;; costsubsidvcoversonlyarelatively
means zero (or.ro." to r"r;y:","; ""y#: 
,I,ZBZ,I,:1X ::""#:?'l"T;:hours. Support is onlv gtven f naf- )"lutio., schemes (ABM), for whichtime employment relations' Yl:Tby^ ti" r"a"".t Labour office and cen-
workinghours may not exceed 80Vo of ;---,-_'^l_-^:_1::."_^^;::^
standard working ti*;";;;il;; tral government meet around 907'
wages are no *or" tt .rr g"o#";;;j :l-tot"' the greater part of the re-
collectively agreed *"" r". rg6dl"- ::yt"t required must come from a
sources for around ?,od;;;;r;;; third partv' This can come either
ear-marked in ttre uudgJtl from the employer's own resources
or from other support schemes run
by central, state and local govern-
ment or the EC.
- 
T?ris "necessity of co-financing" is
intended to bring about a greater
degree of interaction between la-
bour market, economic, environ-
mental and social policy. Co-financ-
ing will, it is hoped, tie in the re-
gional institutions responsible for
economic, environmental and so-
cial policy, e.g. the relevant state-
level ministries, to the labour pro-
motion scheme, and thus bring
about synerry effects.
- 
An additional difference to tradi-
tional job-creation measures is the
fact that in the environmental sec-
tor private, profit-oriented compa-
nies are eligible for the wage-cost
subsidies East. The aim here is to
bring the subsidised activities
closer to the market and thus to
support, to a greater extent than
possible with existing instruments,
the move into self-emplo5rment or
to regular employment relations.
This is a response to the frequently
raised criticism of the use of ABM
programmes in the new federal
states, namely that the strict crite-
ria applied 
- 
the jobs created must
be in the public interest and may
not be profit-oriented 
- 
have so far
effectively prevented the integra-
tion of those institutions imple-
menting the measures 
- 
in particu-
lar the so-called ABS companies 
-
into the market economy; conse-
quently ABM has not provided a
bridge to the regular labour market
(cf. East Germany no. 8, pp. 5-7).
\f,age-cost subsidies in practice
At the end of1993 65,388 people were
receiving support in the form ofwage-
cost subsidies under $249h. The Fed-
eral Government's aim of creating
70,000 subsidised employment rela-
tions in the course of 1993 had thus
almost been reached by the end ofthe
year. However, the measure repre-
sented only partial compensation for
the loss ofABM places: in the course of
the year the number of persons ben-
efrting llom job-creation under the
LPA fell by around 177,000. Adding
the job-creation and $249h measures
together, 1993 saw a fall in the
number of beneficiaries from around
355,000 to about 24l,OO0 (cf. p. 2).
Implementation of the new pro-
gramme began rather hesitantly at
the start of 1993. In addition to a lack
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of information and the initially im-
practical implementation regula-
tions, a major problem proved in prac-
tice to be that of obtaining co-financ-
ing. The institutions implementing
the measures (the "employers")
lacked, and inmostcases stilllack, the
necessary resources, and the federal
state governments were initially slow
in setting up support programmes to
complement the new instrument.
It was only in the environmental
field, especially in the immense task
ofcleaning up the ecological legary of
the GDR 
- 
re-cultivating environ-
mentally polluted formerly industrial
sites or removing commercial build-
ings of firms that have been liqui-
dated 
- 
that complementary financ-
ing, and thus the prospect ofcontinu-
ation for many job-creation projects,
was provided at an early stage. As
ecological damage was considered a
barrier to investment, an agreement
was reached as early as the autumn of
1992 between central and East Ger-
man state govemments to clean up
ecological pollution. This lleed poten-
tial investors from responsibility for
dealing with polluted sites; this task
was taken overby central government
- 
in the form ofthe Tleuhandanstalt(THA) 
- 
and state governments.
These in turn commissioned firms,
whose employees were supported un-
der $249h, with the task, sharing the
costs not covered by the wage-cost
subsidy at a ratio of 60 (THA) to 40
(state) 
- 
75 (TIIA) to 25 (state) for
large-scale projects. On the basis of
this agreement a large number ofjob-
creation measureg whose end was
imminent were continued under the
new form of support without difii-
culty. This was facilitated further by
agreement between the mining and
chemical unions and the Treuhand-
anstalt on special collective agree-
ments for environmental work, which
regulated the continued employment
under $249h ofthose who would have
been made redundant on expiry of
their job-creation schemes. The man-
ner in which co-financing was en-
sured at an early stage is the prime
reason for the dominance of large-
scale environmental projects in the
chemical and lignite mining indus-
tries in the measures receiving sup-
port (cf. table 1). An indirect effect of
this, in turn, is that the new federal
states benefit to very different de-
grees from the new instrument.
Brandenburg and Sachsen-Anhalt
receive a disproportionately large
amount ofsupport, due to the concen-
tration ofold industries and their as-
sociated environmental damage in
these states (cf. table 2).
For $249h measures not covered by
the agreement between central and
state-level government the main
source offinancing must be secured on
a case-by-case basis. This is particu-
larly true ofprojects in the social serv-
ices and youth aid, which depend ei-
thdr on the own resources of the or-
ganisation implementing the meas-
ure 
- 
usually a charity 
- 
or additional
financing by state or local govern-
ment. Although all the eastern federal
states with the exception of Saxony
have now provided appropriate pro-
grammes for the new instrument, the
shortage of resources is making it dif-
ficult, especially in the social services
and youth aid, to obtain the co-financ-
ing without which no claim can be
made for wage-cost subsidies under
$249h. Ttris is why only about2}Vo of
the subsidies provided benefi.t these
areas. In view of the fact that the
social services are a major source of
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employment for women, it is not diffi-
cult to see why women still only ac-
count for 37Vo ofthose receiving these
subsidies (cf. table 1). The privileged
support offered to traditionally male-
dominated activities in the environ-
mental field is why the official aim 
- 
to
ensure that women benefit from
$249h to a degree corresponding to
their share of the unemployed 
- 
has
not been realised.
In order to avoid the short-term
support typical ofABM measures, the
Federal Labour Office provides wage-
cost subsidies under 9249h for a pe-
riod ofthree years. Federal states are,
however, often unable to grant the
necessary complementary funding for
so long a period, due to the uncer-
tainty surrounding their medium-
term budgetary position. Conse-
quently, projects are often Limited to
one year after all, and participants
have to hope for a one-year extension
in the next frnancial year. This uncer-
tainty reduces motivation and makes
it difficult to organise work processes
effectively.
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Table 1: Employees Receiving Wage-Cost Subsidies under S249h
LPA by activity area and gender, end November lgg8
Activity area Employees
absolute 9o
Women as 7o
of total
Environmental work
of which: in
Lignite mining
Chemicals
Steel
Other
Social seryices
Youth aid
Tota]
M,441
13,905
10,453
2,342
17,74t
7,481
3,890
55,812
79.6
24.9
18.7
4.2
31.8
L3.4
7.0
100
27.7
18.3
40.0
18.3
29.0
79.2
58.2
36.7
Source: Figures from the Federal Labour Office; calculations by the editors
Table 2: Employees Receiving Wage-Cost Subsidies under S24gh
LPA bV federal state, end November 1993
Federal state Employees
absolute 4o
For comparison: Share
of unemplo5rment
in new federal states
Mecklenb urg-Vorpomm errr
Brandenburg
Sachsen-Anhalt
Saxony
Thuringia
East Berlin
Total
3,508
tt,529
t6,479
t5,052
6,062
3,182
55,812
6.3
20.7
29.5
27.O
10.9
5.7
100
t2.9
r5.4
19.8
28.1
16.9
6.8
100
Source: Figures from the Federal Labour Office; calculations by the editors
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The controversy surrounding
the new instrument
The concept underlying $249h is in-
novative in many respects, opening
as it does the "labour market policy
ghetto" to some extent, and the new
instrument has been termed a opara-
graph of hope" in the face of the em-
ployrnent crisis in East Germany.
Criticisms have been voiced no less
strongly, however. The "wage-cost
subsidy East" was quickly stigma-
tised as a "slim-line ABM pro-
gramme" or as "dumping ABM". The
fact that the subsidy would provide
work for only a proportion of those
leaving ABM schemes and that the
Federal Labour Office would, in con-
trast to ABM, bear not even half of
the cost of implementing measures
were points of criticism. Controversy
of a more fundamental natures re-
volves around the stipulations gov-
erning pay. The metal-workers' union
IG Metall went so far as to announce
that it would take the matter before
the constitutional court. The require-
ment for a ll%o cut compared with
normal wages implies, according to
the IG Metall, state pay determina-
tion, and unjustified intervention in
the principle of free collective bar-
gaining guaranteed by the German
constitution.
Despite its fundamental reserva-
tions, the IG Metall has since, like the
mining and chemical unions before it,
reached special collective agreement
regulating employment under $249h,
so as not to endanger implementation
ofthe measure altogether. These spe-
cial agreements, which sanction pay
levels below the standards for the
branches in question, have created a
precedence which will influence the
future course of the debate on lower
than collectively agreed wage rates in
publicly supported employment mea-
sures.
Outlook
A year after its introduction, scepti-
cism is called for in evaluating
whether the new instrument really
constitutes an innovative alternative
to existing job-creation programmes.
Criticism has centred on the stipula-
tions on pay and co-frnancing, the dis-
crimination against women and re-
gional inequality.
Moreover, there is little reason to
expect that the instrument clan pro-
TRENDS
states (including East Berlin) were
declared a priority development area
(Promotion of the development and
structural adjustment of underdevel-
oped regions) shortly after German
Unification. This put the new federal
states on a more or less equal footing
as regards EC support with the struc-
turally weakest regions of the Com-
munity such as the Italian Mezzo-
giorno, Greece or Portugal. Of the
ECU 3 billion made available 
- 
rela-
tively quickly and unbureaucratically
- 
during the first support phase from
1991 to 1993,\OVo came from the Eu-
ropean Regional Development Fund
(ERDF), 30Vo ftom the European
Social Fund (ESF) and 207o were due
to projects within the framework
of the European Agricultural Fund
(EAC.GF) (cf. East Germany no.3/4,
The EC Structural Funds in the New Federa! States
- 
Summary and Outlook
In support of the structural change underway in the East German
economy and labour market, the European Cornmunity is making
substantial frnancial support available to the new federal states. This
support comes from the three structural frrnds. Between 1991 and 1993
around ECU 3 billion were granted; in the subsequent support phase,
which runs from 1994 to 1999, aid totallingjust under ECU 14 billion is
plqnned. Besides standard national programmes, in the preceding
phase the Funds also promof,sd innovstive labour market policy ap-
proaches. The European Social Fun4 in particular, enabledpreventive
in-frrm further training projects to be realised, thus closing gaps in
Geman emplo5rment promotion law.
The three Structural Funds are the helping the European Union to attain
most important Community-level in- a greater degree of "economic and so-
struments deployed with the aim of cial cohesion". In view of the pressure
overcoming the inequalities between of economic adjustment and its grave
the different regions ofEurope, thus social consequences, the new federal
vide a significant bridge to the pri-
mary labour market. The narrow
range of areas enjoying support 
- 
in
order to avoid competitive distor-
tions, support is concentrated in ar-
eas which still lack a private supply
potential and substantial effective
demand 
- 
militates against this. As
long as activities are excluded which
have a chance ofestablishing a foot-
hold on the market at a later date,
there is the real danger that the
"wage-cost subsifies East" will re-
main a surrogate ABM scheme. If it
were revised, though, to take account
of the criticisms raised, the new in-
strument might well make an impor-
tant contribution to the East German
transformation process and even of-
fer new labour market policy perspec-
tives for crisis-hit regions in western
Germany.
Bibliography
Alexandra Wagner: "Der Paragraph 249h
AFG 
- 
Ein neues arbeitsmarktpolitisches
Instrument in Ostdeutschland." In: WSI-
Mitte ilunge n, 7 I 7993, pp. 464-466
Robert Schmidt: "Produktive Arbeitsftir-
derung Ost." In: Bundesarbeitsblatt, U
1993, pp. 10-12
10 East Germany no. 10 - February 1994
pp. 9-10). A preliminary look back at
the past three years shows that the
structural funds have all made a con-
tribution, each in a different way, to
the transformation process in East
Germany.
Ihe Regional Fund (ERDF):
Supplementing national
standard programmes
The resources provided by the ERDF(ECU 1.5 billion) were largely de-
ployed to (partly) finance and supple-
ment the joint central and state-level
government programme to improve
regional economic structures in East
Germany ("Gemeinschaftsaufgabe
Verbesserung der regionalen Wirt-
schaftsstruktur" 
- 
GA). This regional
promotion prog?anune, which has
been in operation in the old Federal
Republic since 1970 and which is
planned and frnanced jointly by cen-
tral and federal state government,
was extended to the new federal
states following Unifi cation, initially
for five years. It is now a central ele-
ment of economic support there. The
decisionto extendthe GA as aninstru-
ment of economic reconstruction in
East Germany was taken not least for
reasons of time pressure: it would
have taken considerable time to de-
velop economic support instruments
specifically tailored to the needs ofthe
new federal states. Time was of the
essence not least because of the fact
that participation by the EC struc-
tural funds in financing support is
contingent on the existence ofappro-
priate national programmes. Given
the urgency of the problems, the use of
tried and tested instruments had the
advantage of ensuring the rapid pro-
vision ofthe financial resources avail-
able.
The rapid extension ofthe GAto the
new federal states also had its disad-
vantages, however. So as not to lose
time, and not to miss out on possible
sources of support, no attempt was
made, contrary to funding practice in
West Germany, to concentrate re-
gional support for East Germany on
individual regions or specific areas, or
to differentiate aid conditions be-
tween the different East German re-
gions. Critics have taken the view that
the GA thus spread its resources too
thinly on the so-called watering-can
principle. An additional source of
criticism has been that by incorporat-
ing ERDF resources into the GA the
flexibility of EC support was re-
Regional GDP per capita
as a % of the average
forthe Union, 1991
[ 
'ess 
rnan 5oozo
-". I t50to75%
', i ;'''' 
- 
7s to below 100%
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TRENDS
Regions whose economic performance is below the
European Union average
.:--.,,i
i)
/_ '1
stricted. In contrast to the ERDF, in
the "Gemeinschaftsaufgabe" 
- 
which
had originally been set up to avoid
competitive subsidisation between
West German federal states 
- 
the con-
ditions and requirements of support
are stipulated very precisely; these
rigid conditions were thus also ap-
plied to the provision of EC funds.
The resources made available by
the GA (and thus also by the ERDF)
are generally provided in the form of
direct investment support for firms
and subsidies for infrastructure
projects conducive to economic activ-
ity. Due to the very slow pace ofrecov-
ery in the East German economy,
fewer firms than expected actually
claimed direct investment support
over the past three years. Conse-
quently, priority was accorded to im-
proving East German infrastructure,
the aim being to facilitate private eco-
nomic activity. Examples of such
projects include opening up industrial
and commercial sites, support for in-
dustrial and small business centres
and improvingtransport and commu-
nications.
'6
'I},i\
'*:)''t
l
The Social Fund (ESF):
Facilitating preventive labour
market policy
The ESF (ECU 0.9 billion) was used by
the newfederal states and the Federal
Labour Office in order to extend and
supplement labour market policy
measures, in particular vocational
training. In contrast to the ERDF, the
ESF served not only to boost standard
national programmes, but also com-
pensated for deficits and gaps in na-
tional support under the Labour Pro-
motion Act (LPA), thus enabling the
new federal states to realise new
training concepts based on the idea of
preventive labour market policy. In
particular, the ESF promoted in-plant
further training, a form of training
largely excluded from support under
the LPA because of the fear of take-
away effects. The training measures
financed by the ESF are aimed not
only at the unemployed but also 
-
indeed especially 
- 
at still employed
workers who, due to structural
change, would be threatened with un-
employment in the absence of further
training.
ESF funds were provided, at fed-
eral state level, for the following pre-
ventive measures (examples):
^/"-\\,\\\
. /t(*'P\)
Source: EUROSTAT, Regio-databank
The figures from the various Member States were converted using purchasing power
parities.
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- 
a4justment training of core work-
forces in privatised small and me-
dium-sized flrms;
- 
a{ustment training of research
and development staffin firms;
- 
recruitment and start-up help in
setting up small and medium-sized
firms;
- 
training measures for newly cre-
ated businesses. It is in theBe areas
in particular that ESF funding
compensated deficits in German
support legislation, as support un-
der the LPA aims primarily at wage
and salary earners.
Other programmes, funded jointly by
the ESF and central and state-Ievel
government, enabled young people
whose enterprises had been closed to
complete their vocational training,
either in other firms or in external
training centres.
In addition to preventive training
measures in inclividual federal states
the Social Fund also supported,
through the Federal Labour Office,
participants in further training meas-
ures under the LPA by providing addi-
tional benefits. These included:
- 
maintenance benefits for individu-
als who, due to inadequate periods
of social insurance contributions,
were not entitled to maintenance
allowa"ce under tt(e LPA;
- 
assumption of child-care costs to an
amount exceeding the maximum
available under the LPA (DM 120
instead of DM 60 per month; in
cases ofhardship up to DM 250),
- 
reimbursement of higher costs for
travelling between home and train-
ing centre;
- 
raising the work familiarisation al-
Iowance to West German levels in
cases where a worker entitled to
support is transferred to a West
German plant.
furicultural Fund (EAGGF)
The resources provided by the
EAGGF (ECU 0.6 billion) are used to
support necessary structural change
inrural areas. Themainaims here are
village renewal and the modernisa-
tion of agriculture, fishing, forestry
and the food industry. In addition,
support has been provided for re-
equipping individual agricultural en-
terprises, restructuring agricultural
co-operatives as private firms and
one-offprojects such as processing or
marketing centres (slaughter-houses,
wholesale markets etc.).
New support phase 1994 to 1999
As in the previous phase from 1991 to
1993, the new federal states including
East Berlin will enjoy the status of
target-l regions in EC structural as-
sistance. This entitles them to top
priority for support, the highest level
of resource input, and the greatest
degree of freedom in determining tar-
get groups, types ofmeasure and re-
gional emphasis. The classification as
a priority development area is in ac-
cordance with the fact that in terms of
economic performance East Germany
is lagging roughly as far behind the
EuropeanUnion average as Greece or
Portugal (cf. map).
The division of funds 
- 
which will
total almost ECU 14 billion 
- 
is ex-
pected to be as follows:
ERDF ECU 6.8 billion
ESF ECU 4.l billion
EAC'GF ECU 2,7 billion
Federal Labour Office ECU l.l billion
Berlin ECU 0.8 billion
Brandenburg ECU 2.2 billion
Mecklenburg-Vorpom m err
Saxony
Sachsen-Anhalt
Thuringia
ECU 1.9 billion
ECU 3.5 billion
ECU 2.4 billion
ECU 2.0 billion
It is as yet difficult to predict where
the emphasis of support will be laid in
each case. This is due to the limited
progress made in the ongoing applica-
tion procedure to the EC. The details
of the support to be made available
are not expected before the spring of
1994.
At the same time, it is unlikely that
major changes will be made com-
pared with the initial support phase.
The resources provided by the ERDF
will probably remain tied to the "Ge-
meinschaftsaufgabe". The use of ESF
resources is also likely to follow past
practice, although a more pro-
nounced regional emphasis is ex-
pected.
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